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From  a  purely  theoretical  perspective,  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  that 
different levels of contributions in public goods games are associated with the 
same  sanctioning/rewarding  rule.  The  efficiency  of  a  norm  should  be 
independent of its enactment procedure. On the contrary, multidisciplinary and 
empirical  considerations  suggest  that  individuals  may  behave  differently, 
according  to  the  level  of  their  direct  involvement.  The  question  whether 
participation in norm enactment results in more contributory gap than when 
the same norm is received, has not been addressed in public good literature so 
far. Our three experiments show a behavioural regularity: participating in a 
normative enactment generates different contributory effects, with respect to 
the case when the sanctioning norm is merely received.  
 






Free riding is one of the main implications deriving the theoretical models of public good 
provision  with  voluntary  contribution  mechanisms.  Conversely,  a  common  experimental 
result is that the level of personal contribution is often positive but inefficient, and many 
explanatory  reasons  are  still  being  discussed  for  this  weak  free  riding.  The  positive 
contributions  may  be  interpreted  by  following  two  possible  explanations.  The  first  one 
concerns how to explain the gap between the theoretic prediction of no contribution and the 
empirical results (e.g., Kim & Walker, 1984; Fisher, Isaac, Schatzberg & Walker, 1995; Chu 
& Li, 1999; Cornes & Schweinberger, 1996; Sandler, Sterbenz & Posnett, 1987). The second 
line explains the positive contribution in terms of behavioural effects, as fairness (Fehr & 
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Schmidt, 1999), altruism and co-operation (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Sefton & Steinberg, 1996; 
Gachter, Fehr & Kment, 1996; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Fischbacher, Gachter & Fehr, 2001), 
reciprocity  (Sudgen,  1984;  Sethi  and  Somanathan,  2001,  2003),  social  preferences 
(Fischbacher  &  Gachter,  2006),  conditional  cooperation  (Fischbacher,  Gachter  &  Fehr, 
2001), different beliefs and expectations (Offerman, Sonnemans, Schram, 2001), specific 
Value  Orientation  (Offerman,  Sonnemans  &  Schram,  1996)  or  as  a  combination  of  the 
aforementioned elements (Janssen & Ahn, 2006). 
Beside the explanations of the positive contributions, literature deems two complementary 
instruments  to  improve  the  levels  of  contribution:  one  is  to  reinforce  the  observed  co-
operation  by  using  systems  of  incentives,  and  the  other  is  to  repress  the  remaining 
opportunism by adopting sanctioning systems.  
Scholars  recognize  two  different  typologies  of  incentives,  the  first  is  obtained  by 
modifying factors in the experimental design
2 that affect positively the co-operation (e.g., 
Weimann, 1994; Orr, 2001), whereas the second type concerns more directly the aspects 
linked with monetary returns, like the payoff structure and rewards (Sefton & Steinberg, 
1996).  
To explain the sanctioning/rewarding systems and their effects is necessary to refer to the 
particular  theoretical  benchmarks,  both  standard  and  behavioural  models.  The  standard 
microeconomic model predicts that no rational agent will punish the others whenever it costs 
him in monetary terms. Assuming representative agents (i.e. with perfect rationality and self-
centred preference) the punishment will never be efficient if the marginal profit of free riding 
will be greater than the marginal cost of avoiding the punishment (see for example Fehr & 
Gachter, 2000.a; Sefton, Shupp & Walker, 2007). When the standard classical model is not 
the principal benchmark, how punishments affect individual choices is not uniquely defined. 
For  example,  punishment  may  act  via  inequity  aversion  (Fehr  &  Schmidt,  1999;  Ahn, 
Ostrom, & Walker, 2003; Dannenberg, Riechmann, Sturm & Vogt, 2007), through negative 
reciprocity considerations (Sefton, Shupp & Walker, 2007; Ones & Putterman, 2007), or 
through conditional cooperation (Fischbacher, Gachter, & Fehr, 2001; Kurzban & Houser, 
2001).  All  these  latest  approaches  underline  the  importance  of  introducing  models  with 
heterogeneity of agents (e.g., Carpenter, 2002). 
The heterogeneity assumption increases the level of adaptability to the real context, but 
simultaneously increases also the complexity of the problem to design a perfect and efficient 
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audit/sanctioning  system.  A  possible  compromise  may  be  to  search  for  alternative 
instruments  that  may  indirectly  lead  to  a  personal  conformity,  without  excluding  the 
heterogeneity hypothesis. To this purpose, a more recent tendency in public good games is to 
deem norms, social norms and norms enforcement to play an important role in contributory 
dynamics.  This  is  possible  whenever  economics  analysis  is  enriched  with  a  socio-
psychological  perspective.  At  least  three  common  considerations  about  conformity  and 
social norms arise between socio-psychological approach and economics. First both of them 
deem  fairness,  altruism  and  reciprocity  to  be  important  social  norms.  Secondly  both 
disciplines commonly  define the norm  enforcement  to be  the set  of  possible  devices by 
which norms are held in place. Finally both of them consider social norms as tools which 
yield coordination in social contexts (e.g., Opp, 2002; Ostrom, 1990). 
Scholars have being recently studied the role of norm enforcements, in order to better 
understand why, and to what extent, people adopt, accept or comply with a norm. The causal 
relationship  between  norms  and  behaviour  is  very  complex,  because  it  involves 
simultaneously different components, such as beliefs, expectations, individual characteristics 
(for example, individual preferences for conformity), and environmental settings (such as 
group size, possibility of communication, complexity of the information available, and so 
on). 
In  case  of  public  good  games,  there  are  at  least  two  complementary  perspectives  to 
investigate the contributory implications of the norms. The first one is individual-centred, 
that is to say it concerns how norms affect individual contributions in terms of expectations 
(e.g.,  Bicchieri,  2006)  communication,  (e.g.,  Carpenter,  2004;  Young,  2006)  norm 
enforcement and conformity (i.e. individual preferences, as in Camerer & Fehr, 2002; Perez, 
2008).  The  second  perspective  is  institutional-centred,  that  is  to  say  it  concerns  the 
comparison of how different  normative enactments  affect individual/aggregated  levels  of 
contributions, in terms of institutional decisions (i.e. decentralized or centralized systems, as 
for instance in Falkinger, 2004) and collective decisional mechanisms, making comparisons 
between endogenously-exogenously imposed institutional systems (e.g., Okada, 1993, 1997; 
Kosfeld  &  Rield,  2004;  Kosfeld,  Okada  &  Rield,  2006).  Moreover,  other  studies  about 
compliance in public good games consist in comparing different types of sanctioning norms 
(Decker, Stiehler & Strobel 2003), different way by which they are applied to the games 
(Tyran and Feld, 2006) and different kinds of obligations (Galbiati and Vertova, 2008). 
Despite the presence of a large number of experimental studies about free riding and 
sanctioning/rewarding systems, to the best of our knowledge, there is no investigation on the 
question whether participation in norm enactment results in different contributory behaviour   4
than when the same norm is received. As a matter of the fact, from a purely theoretical 
perspective, there is no reason to expect that different levels of contribution are associated to 
the same sanctioning/rewarding rule. The efficiency of a norm should be independent of its 
enactment procedure, taking other conditions as fixed. Nevertheless, multidisciplinary and 
empirical considerations suggest that individuals may behave differently according to their 
direct  involvement.  For  instance,  Law  scholars  deem  the  importance  of  the  Subsidiarity 
principle  and  the  active  role  of  citizens  in  the  administration  of  the  public  assets  (e.g., 
Bohman, 1999; Miller, 1992). 
In the present study, our experimental question aims at testing whether participating in a 
constituent process affects contributions in public goods environments. Our experimental 
investigation will therefore answer the following question: 
Does  participating in  a collective  decision affect the levels of  contributions  provided, 
ceteris paribus? 
The remaining parts of the paper provide the description of our experimental design and the 
results  observed  in  its  three  replications  (named  Pilot  Experiment,  A  Experiment  and  B 
Experiment respectively). Our results suggest the existence of a participation effect, here 
intended as behavioural consequence of an active involvement in a decision making process 
with public goods frame.  
 
GAME DESCRIPTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
Our  experimental  design  summarizes  previous  contributions  to  classical  public  good 
games,  but  it  is  also  strictly  linked  to  the  sanctioning  dimension,  in  particular  to  the 
consideration  of  different  ways  to  insert  rules  in  the  game.  The  principal  novelty  is 
represented by the sanctioning mechanism in itself, because it is endogenously determined 
by experimental agents. This not only allows one to study the effect of a sanctioning system, 
but also to observe what kind of sanctioning rule is collectively decided. Moreover, agents 
who participate in the creation process are directly involved in a public good game. This 
implies a double public good perspective: a first-order public good (resulting from the public 
good game), and a second-order public good game (resulting from the collective decision 
regard the sanctioning system). 
In order to single out the role of Participation, two groups are compared. The first group 
(First Group, Gr1) participates in the decisional process, whereas the second one (Second 
Group, Gr2) does not. They both play two games: the Basic Game (BG) and the Basic Game 
with Rule (BG+R).    5
The Rule is the same for both groups, with only one main difference: the rule is created by 
the experimental group by a decisional process, called “Rule-Phase”. In this sense, the First 
Group plays BG+R in which the rule has been self- created, and the Second Group plays 
BG+R with the same rule which, however, has been imposed. 
Each  possible  final  rule,  determined  in  the  Rule-Phase,  may  be  intended  as  a  “legal 
paradigm” in a Law perspective. As commonly accepted, different rules may have different 
effects, in terms of obligations, sanctions, rewards and so on. This is clearly linked to studies 
that focus on the role of different legal paradigms in disciplining the same problem (as in 
Decker, Stiehler, & Strobel, 2003). Our perspective, however, is very different: in fact, we 
are  investigating  whether  the  same  norm  has  different  effects  on  the  same  problem 
discipline,  only  according  to  the  way  by  which  the  norm  is  determined.  There  is  no 
theoretical support to such consideration. The same norm should have the same regulation 
effects, independently of its enactment or emanation. Our approach is hence more similar to 
the  institutional  mechanism  comparisons,  where  different  regulation  systems  may  have 
different  implications.  Our  experimental  perspective  may,  with  some  precaution,  mimic 
situations in which decentralized decisions are compared with centralized ones. For example, 
the experimental design may represent a test for the principle of Subsidiarity
3.  
This experiment has been run under a pilot version, and under two other replications. We 
will define these three experiments as the class of “Standard Versions”, used to differentiate 
these experiments from the “Software Version” in Bortolami (2008). The main difference 
between the Standard Versions and the Software Version is in the communication modality 
adopted during the “Rule-Phase”. In the standard versions, experimental agents interact by 
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For instance, the principle of Subsidiarity has two characterizations in the Italian Constitution: there is 
a  vertical  Subsidiarity  (art.  117)  and  a  horizontal  Subsidiarity  (art.  118).  The  vertical  dimension 
recognizes  a  bottom-up  perspective,  in  which  the  State  may  delegate  some  competence  to  local 
institutions (decentralization). The horizontal Subsidiarity concerns more directly the active role of 
citizens  in  collective  activities,  that  is:  “The  State,  regions,  metropolitan  cities,  provinces  and 
municipalities  shall  promote  the  autonomous  initiatives  of  citizens,  both  as  individuals  and  as 
members of associations, relating to activities of general interest, on the basis of the principle of 
Subsidiarity” (art. 118).   6
METHOD 
Participants 
The global game is proposed to two groups, the experimental one and the control one. Each 
consists of 14 members, chosen randomly (by voluntary subscription to the game) among 
students at the University of Trento (Italy). 
Before the game starts, each member is given a personal identity number (ID), in order to 
maintain the anonymity condition during the entire game. Before making the first choice, all 
the instructions
4 are read aloud by the experimenter and any doubts are clarified.  
Procedure 
The sequence of the game is the following (see details in the next sections): 
1.  Both groups play five rounds of the “Basic Game”. The BG belongs to the family of 
linear public good games with voluntary contribution mechanism, without infra-group 
communication.  
At  the  beginning  of  each  round,  people  have  to  decide  their  personal  choice  of 
investment  and  key  it  in.  After  this,  the  computer  collects  all  the  choices  and 
communicates the total amount of the public good provided. 
2.  The  experimental  group  proceeds  with  the  “Rule-Phase”,  in  which  the 
sanctioning/rewarding rule is determined.  
The final rule is the output of five different phases in succession. Each phase is presented 
separately, and people do not know the specific content of each phase in detail, but they 
commonly know the total number of the phases and what each phase will regulate. At 
the beginning of the “Rule-Phase” they are informed that they have to decide about: 
1.   When the control will take place; 
2.   How many people will be controlled; 
3.   The type of punishment; 
4.   The possibility to reward; 
5.   The type of reward. 
Each phase consists in a discussion stage about a set of alternatives, followed by a voting 
referendum  (with  majority  criterion).  After  reading  the  list  of  available  alternatives, 
people discuss about the effect of the single options, and then they vote anonymously for 
their preferred one. The option that obtains the majority is called the “finalist”. The final 
rule is hence the result collection of the five finalist options, each resulting from one of 
the five distinct phases. 
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3.  Finally, the experimental group and the control group play the five rounds of the BG 
again, but now knowing that the rule (BG+R) is in force. Since the norm is created by 
the first group, we will define the rule as endogenously enacted or self determined in the 
BG+R of the first group (constituent group), while the same norm will be defined as 
exogenously enacted or imposed when it will be applied in the BG+R of the second 
group (recipient group). 
The actual final payoff is determined according to the individual personal performances. It is 
common knowledge (i.e. it is clearly stated in the instructions) that the payment will be 
provided at the end of the whole game (i.e. after the BG+R), by random extraction of one 
round  for  each  game.  This  method  is  adopted  in  order  to  exclude  any  uncontrolled 
interference among games, and to allow the games to be considered as multiple one-shot 
games when they are separately analysed. 
 
The “Basic Game” (BG) 
The  Basic  Game  is  a  classical  linear  Public  Good  Game  with  Voluntary  Contribution 
Mechanism (linear PGG with VCM), repeated for five rounds. The aim of the Basic Game 
structure is to create a strong scenario in which free riding behaviour is expected to take 
place.  The  specific  parameters  used  are  justified  both  in  light  of  strong  theoretical 
predictions, and of behavioural extensions resulting from the most recent public good games 
literature. 
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Where the individual amount spent on the public good is qi, and the total amount of public 
good provided, Q, which coincides with the sum of all individual contributions to the public 







. Moreover, the residual part  ) ( i q E − of the initial endowment is 
directly invested in the private fund. 
The parameters α and  β  define the return from the private investment and the return of 
the  public  investment,  respectively.  The  theoretical  condition  which  predicts  null 
contributions is obtained by the relationship between the ratio of the investment rates, i.e. by 
considering the marginal per capita return (MPCR) and the group size, n. Recalling that 
α
β
= MPCR , that condition becomes (see, for example, Sefton and Steinberg, 1996): 
MPCR n MPCR ⋅ < <1               [2]   8
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Where  10 E =  Euro;  1 = α ;  08 . 0 = β .  
Independently of the choice of the other members, the dominant Nash equilibrium with 
0 = q   Euro  is  theoretically  predicted.  Nevertheless,  the  experimental  results  of  positive 
contributions  coming  from  experimental  literature have  suggested that  completely  strong 
free riding (i.e.  0 = q ) should not be expected, but rather that, given this combination of 
elements, it is more proper to expect levels of weak free riding (i.e.  4 0 ≤ ≤ i q ). 
 
The Rule-Phase 
The Rule-Phase consists in the determination of a control rule by the experimental group by 
means of a specific and new procedure. The aim of this phase is to choose a control norm in 
an endogenous way, i.e. experimental agents are directly involved in deciding the type of 
norm they will self- enact. 
We  consider  free  riding  behaviour  as  the  individual  contributions  to  the  public  fund 
belonging to the range  4 0 ≤ ≤ i q . This close interval is chosen according to the observed 
empirical results in literature, which show investments in the public good of 40%-60% of 
initial endowments, but here we restrict the range  also  according to our payoff function 
implications predicted in the Basic Game.  
The norm is generated by combining elements of a set of alternatives already formulated 
in the experimental design. Therefore, it is more proper to state that the group chooses, rather 
than completely generating, a control norm. Presenting a set of already-made alternatives is 
only aimed at allowing choices to be feasible, i.e. the final combination of the elements can 
effectively be played. In simpler words, the decision to present a list of possible elements 
does not aim at reducing the number of feasible rules, but it is structured so as to maintain 
the experimental design under control.  
The  final  norm  is  the  sum  of  five  different  elements  determined  in  succession,  each 
established  separately  in  a  single  different  phase  (so  that  there  are  five  phases  in  all)
5. 
Experimental agents decide what option they prefer, among a set of alternatives (options) for 
each phase. The choice is collectively determined with a specific procedure consisting of a 
discussion stage and of a voting stage.  
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components. The first and second components have 5 options, the third one has 3 options and the last 
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Experimental agents decide: 
1.  When the control takes place (1
st. phase; 1
st. component); 
2.  The number of subjects to be investigated (2
nd. phase; 2
nd. component); 




4.  The type of reward (4
th. phase; 4
th. component); 




The  discussion  stage  allows  agents  to  exchange  opinions  about  the  efficacy  of  each 
option, to make comments about the role of the component, and so on, but they are not 
allowed to communicate strategic future decisions (i.e. they cannot state anything about their 
future contribution in the Basic Game with Rule). Within this frame, communication may be 
considered  as  cheap  talk  and  causes  no  binding  agreement,  above  all  because  future 
contributions  and  voting  decisions  will  still  be  anonymous  (and,  hence,  they  might  be 
completely different from those established in the discussion stage). 
After the time allocated for the discussion (ex ante determined in the experimental design) 
is  over,  people  proceed  with  the  voting  phase.  They  have  to  anonymously  choose  their 
preferred option. The option that obtains the majority of preferences is defined as the winner, 
and people proceed to the next phase. In our Rule-Phase, voting is essentially included as an 
instrument  of  collective  decision,  i.e.  as  a  social  instrument  to  aggregate  individual 
preferences into a collective one. The majority rule is inserted on the basis of a trade-off 
between the effective achievement of the goal (that is, to obtain a social decision), and the 
robustness  of  such  choice.  We  are  perfectly  aware  that  the  unanimity  rule  will  better 
represent individual choices but, considering our group size and the complex step by step 
procedure, the majority rule will be the best balance between the benefits of the unanimity 
rule,  and  its  highest  procedural  costs  (these  considerations  parallel  those  classically 
supported by Buchanan & Tullock
6, 1962). 
In our design, the voting procedure is also adopted in order to take into account some 
individual signalling considerations raised in recent experimental studies (see, for example, 
Tyran & Feld, 2006), or as a form of prior commitment, stronger than the simple discussion 
phase.  Anyway,  these  implications  will  be  taken  into  account  in  our  discussion  of  the 
experimental  results,  rather  than  being  a  structured  environmental  decision.  This  is  so 
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because our main focus will be on the comparison between the two groups (experimental and 
control ones), rather than on an in-group analysis.  
Each component of the rule presents several options, some of which (i.e. those concerning 
the sanctioning structure) are associated with different costs of implementation. The cost of 
implementation is inserted to mimic real contexts, in which several regulatory systems are 
provided by individual payments. In our frame, the regulatory system is the mechanism of 
punishment and  rewarding.  The  mechanism is  supplied  by  collective  provision, i.e. it is 
financed by individual and coactive withdrawals.  
The costs are generally separated into collective and private costs. Collective costs are 
associated  with  the  mere  application  of  the  norm,  and  they  concern  only  the  first  two 
components (i.e. the moment in which the control will take place, and the number of persons 
audited). These costs are non rival and non excludible, and their calculation affects the level 
of total public good collectively provided. Private costs concern the individual consequence 
of the norm application, i.e. they are associated with individual sanctions and individual 
rewards. The calculation of these costs affects uniquely the individual payoffs, and so they 
are private goods (i.e. rival and excludible).  
The costs are structured by considering a common trade-off: the more audits take place 
(both in terms of controlled people and of number of rounds audited), the higher will be the 
costs sustained. This is so because a higher number of controls has the advantage of strongly 
deterring free riding behaviour, but it has the disadvantage of having higher costs. This cost 
implementation seeks to parallel real contexts in which there are no economies of scale in the 
control  technologies,  so  that  frequent  controls  on  large  samples  are  logistically  more 
expensive. 
The choice of specific costs, i.e. the concrete amount associated to each option, has two 
main justifications. The first one is that explained above, i.e. to maintain the parallel between 
higher costs and higher potential efficacy in containing free riding incentives. The second 
motivation regards the feasibility of the combination of options. As stated above, we do not 
restrict the type of possible norm enforced, in the sense that we allow the possibility to 
differentiate the severity of the punishments from the power of the norm on the whole, but 
we have to keep the environment controlled. In this perspective, the specific cost percentages 
are experimentally chosen among a restricted range of alternatives. Within the same phase, 
they are proportional to each other, in order to realize the above-mentioned parallel between 
costs and potential efficiency. From one phase to the other, the composition of costs must 
keep the feasibility of the game.   11
In an individual perspective, the aforementioned trade-off between high costs and high 
efficiency parallels  a social-individual dilemma.  In  fact, higher costs  are  associated with 
greater power in achieving the group goal (i.e. to enact a strong rule), but they have to be 
individually paid. In other words, by analyzing the final rule we can observe the extent to 
which  people  are  prone  to  sacrificing  personal  payoffs  in  order  to  achieve  the  goal  of 
repressing opportunism and, consequently, to obtaining the social maximum payoff. This 
perspective seems to be similar to Yamagishi’s model of Sanctioning System (1986), built 
on structural goal and mutual cooperation. 
In order to achieve feasibility, we have calculated three extreme cases in which the final 
rule may be placed, which are: highest efficiency, medium efficiency and lowest efficiency. 
All other feasible combinations belong to intermediate characterizations of the closed set 
delimited by the extreme positions. In other words, there will no other highest or lowest 
composition. However, it is important to state that all possible combinations never change 
the dominance of Nash equilibrium, that is, the severity of the norm will never be such to 
make the contribution be the dominant strategy. Adopting Tyran’s and Feld terminology 
(2006), all of our rules are defined as “mild” laws and never “severe” ones. 
When the rule is finally established, the general payoff function in the BG+R becomes: 
a) In case the player is audited (with probability
14 5
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Where: 
r is the number of round controlled; n is the number of subjects controlled; C is the sum of 
all collective costs associated with the specific rule; R is the Reward; P is the Punishment.  
This general payoff function changes according to the options chosen by the subjects in the 
rule  phase.  Table  1  specifies  what  are  the  values  associated  with  every  option  and  the 
associated costs (see the Instructions in Appendix for details). 
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Phase 
Options and Associated Costs (c) 
A  B  C  D  E 
1 
r = 1 (fixed at the 
beginning), 
c = 0.05Q 
r=1 (random), 
c = 0.03Q 
r = 2, 
c= 0.06 Q 
r = 3, 
c= 0.09Q 
r = 5, 
c=0. Q 










3  Yes  No       
4  R= 0.02Q 
(windfall) 
R= 0.02Q 
(endogenous)       
5  P=0.02 Q  P=0.1πi 
P= α Q 
α =0.05Q, If qi =0 
α =0.04Q, If qi =1 
α =0.03Q, If qi =2 
α =0.02Q, If qi =3 
α =0.01Q, If qi =4 
P= β πi 
β=0.10, If qi =0 
β=0.08, If qi =1 
β=0.06, If qi =2 
β=0.04, If qi =3 
β=0.02, If qi =4 
P= πi 
 
Table 1. The parameters associated with the Rule’s options. 
 
For the sake of exposition suppose the subjects determine a rule combination with {1C; 2A; 
3A; 4A and 5E}. The associated values will be (r=2; n=1; R=0.02Q; P= πi). The specific 
payoff function would become: 
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In order to test the Participation extent, we compare the results obtained in the BG+R by the 
two groups (between-groups analysis) through different indexes of efficiency: 
- The total level of public good provided; 
- The individual average contributions; 
- The group allocations distinguished into different contributory classes
7; 
                                                
7  Specifically,  we  differentiate  strong  free  riding  contributions  (i.e.  q  =  0);  week  free  riders 
contributions (i.e. 1≤ q ≤ 4); half endowment contributors (i.e. q = 5) and cooperative contributors 
(i.e. 6≤ q ≤ 10).   13
- The number of free riders 
The groups are compared in a Group History perspective (i.e. considering the BG+R results 
in the complete game) and in a round-wise comparison. In particular, special attention is paid 
to the first round comparison in the BG+R, since we may suspect that in such round a “pure 
participating  effect”  will  be  take  place.  With  the  elimination  of  potential  History  game 
effects, we concentrate therefore on the pure enactment effect. 
We measure the relative normative efficacy trough a within-group comparison before-
after the normative enactment. To this purpose, we compare the variation of the public good 
provided, balanced on the maximum amount achievable at the end of the game history
8. In 
individual perspective, we confront the individual average level of contributions without-
with norm. 
We provide the BG’s between-groups comparison only to assure that both groups start to 
play  the BG+R under the same  conditions.  In  other  words,  we  verify that  there  are  not 
significant differences in the baseline stage. 
 
Pilot Experiment 
The Comparison of the Basic Games 
The week free riding behaviour is the main prediction in the BG, since we structured our 
environment to refer to previous experimental evidence in the literature. To this purpose, we 
expect the average contributions will belong to the range 0-40% of both initial endowments 
(in an individual perspective), and aggregate level of public good provided (in a collective 
dimension). 
The first five rounds in Figure 1 show the total level of public good yielded (Q) in both 
groups (henceforth Gr1P will be the constituent group, and Gr2P will be the recipient group 
in the Pilot Experiment).  
Comparing the aggregate levels of contribution between-groups, both in the round-wise 
and in the general game perspective, Gr1P and Gr2P display similar contributory behaviours. 
In particular, over the entire history of the game, Gr1P achieves 32% of the maximum level 
of public good available and Gr2P obtains 29%. No round-wise between-groups comparison 
underlines any significant difference between aggregate levels of public good provided (see 
Table 2). In the game history perspective, the total public good provided is not significantly 
different between-groups (M-W test,  465 . 0 = p ). 
                                                
8Provided that there are 14 members, 5 rounds and the full contribution is 10 euro for each members, 
the maximum level obtainable is equal to 700 euro. This ratio will be used as measure to compare the 
participation effect between-groups. Moreover, following the example in Tyran and Feld (2006) the 
ratio will be used as measure of norm efficiency between-experiments.   14
Between-groups 
(Mann-Whitney Test)  R1-R1  R2-R2  R3-R3  R4-R4  R5-R5 
Gr1P-Gr2P  p= 0.598  p= 0.148  p= 0.565  p= 0.747  p= 0.550 
 
Table 2. Between-groups analysis. Round-wise comparisons (level of Q) in BG.P 
 
The BG individual average contributions are not significantly different between-groups (M-
W test,  597 . 0 = p ). Specifically, individual contributory averages (q ) belong to the week 
free riding range ( 2 . 3 1 = P Gr q  Euro and  9 . 2 2 = P Gr q  Euro). 
 
The voted rule (P-Rule) 
The final rule is the combination of the options {1B; 2D; 3A; 4A; 4E} with associated values 
(r=1; n=5; R= 0.02Q; P=πi). It means that the final rule establishes to control only one round, 
randomly extracted by the experimenter at the end of the BG+R. The number of audited 
people is 5/14 subjects. If the extracted player is a contributor, she/will receive an extra 
payment coinciding with 2% of the collective fund. To the contrary, if the selected player is 
a weak free rider, she/he will lose the entire payoff. The total cost of this rule enactment is 
3.5% of the total public good provided. 
This  rule  is  considered  a  medium-severe  norm  among  the  available  set  of  normative 
formulation. Notwithstanding, this norm is the most severe in terms of punishment, since it 
causes people to lose their entire payoff. The effect of the reward may be neutral, since it 
depends  on  the  level  of  public  good  provided.  Finally,  the  costs  associated  to  this  rule 
composition make the Q columns to shift at maximum of one column to the left in the payoff 
table.  
Given these observations, the final payoff is differentiated among eventual contributors and 
eventual free riders: 
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Fig. 1 The level of total public good provided (Q) in the Pilot Experiment 
 
The results of the BG+R in the Pilot Experiment 
After Gr1P has defined the normative formulation, both groups replay the same version of 
the  BG.  Players  are  perfectly  aware  that  the  rule  is  effectively  in  force  in  BG+R  with 
retroactive effects. In other words, they commonly know that the control will be realized at 
the end of BG+R. 
The  rule  is  exogenously  enforced  in  the  BG+R  game,  since  we  execute  for  sure  its 
sanctioning implications at the end of the game. Inasmuch as the only difference between-
groups is in the presence of direct participation to the collective decision, possible between-
groups diversity will be traced back to the positive extent of participation.  
 
A.  The total level of public good provided and individual contributory averages 
The second five rounds in Figure 1 illustrate the total level of public good provided after the 
insertion of the norm. In a between-groups game history perspective, Gr1P always displays 
greater total amounts invested in the collective fund. At the end of BG+R, Gr1P achieves 
57%  of  maximum  public  good  obtainable,  whereas  Gr2P  provides  35%.  This  aggregate 
provision is significantly different between groups (Mann Whitney test,  009 . 0 = p ).  
Table  3  provides  the  round-wise  between-  groups  comparison  about  collective  levels 
supplied. We observe that the first three rounds are significantly different between-groups, 
but the fourth and the last ones reduce the contributory gap. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note  that  the  first  round  is  highly  significant  and  it  presents  the  maximum  contributory 
difference. This result has a relevant role, since we suppose that in the first round the pure 
participation effect is isolated, that is, contributory behaviors are less influenced by further 
game dynamics.   16
Between-groups 
(Mann-Whitney Test)  R1-R1  R2-R2  R3-R3  R4-R4  R5-R5 
Gr1P-Gr2P  p= 0.008  p= 0.034  p= 0.043  p= 0.107  p= 0.056 
 
Table 3. Between-groups analysis. Round-wise comparisons (level of Q) in BG+R.P 
 
The aforementioned observations are summarized in our first result:  
Result  1.P  After  the  rule  enactment,  the  constituent  group  contributes,  on  average, 
significantly more than the recipient group. In the round-wise between-groups comparison, 
the first round presents the larger contributory gap. 
 
The individual contributory averages with the norm enactment are respectively  7 . 5 1 = P Gr q  
Euro and  5 . 3 2 = P Gr q  Euro. Mann-Whitney tests confirms that members in Gr1P contribute 
significantly more than those in Gr2B (M-W test,  001 . 0 = p ).  
Compared with the BG case, the introduction of the norm has positive effects on the 
individual contributions for both groups. The Gr1P individual average contribution is nearly 
double in the BG+R; the level observed in the BG+R is 1,07 times greater than the one 
obtained in the BG. Such increment is highly significant (Wilcoxon test,  003 . 0 = p ). Gr2P 
individual  average  contribution  slightly  improves,  but  the  difference  is  not  statistically 
different (Wilcoxon test,  396 . 0 = p ).  
B.  Contributory allocations and number of free riders 
Figure 2 shows how individual contributions are distributed throughout the total history of 
the game. A first clear observation regards the common modal value between the groups, 
that  is  5 = q   (52,8%  of  cases  in  Gr1P  and  66%  of  cases  in  Gr2P).  Nevertheless,  Gr1P 
contributions are mainly distributed to the right of the modal value, that is, in the class of 
cooperative contribution (37% of the cases against the 3% in the Gr2P). To the contrary, 
Gr2P contributions are allocated on the left of the modal value, that is, in the class of free 
riding contribution (31% of the case in Gr2P and 10% of cases in Gr1P). Mann Whitney test 
verifies  that  both  the  free  riding  and  the  cooperative  classes  are  significantly  different 
between-groups ( 02 . 0 = p  in both cases).  




















Fig. 2. Frequencies for type of allocation (q) in the BG+R.P 
 
Result 2.P Regardless of the way by which the norm is enacted, the modal value is q=5 for 
both  groups.  Nevertheless,  with  endogenous  enactment  the  numbers  of  cooperative 
allocations is significantly greater than in the case of norm imposition. Furthermore, the 
number of free riding allocations is significantly smaller in the case of self-creation than in 
the case of norm imposition.  
 
Experiment A 
This experiment is the first replication of the Pilot version. The principal aim of Experiment 
A is to verify whether the behavioural gap previously emerged is still observed, even in case 
of enacting a different final rule. As stated in the presentation of the experimental design, our 
environment does not allow to anticipate what the final norm will be. The high number of 
possible combinations do not exclude that the constituent group should determine a very 
mild or inefficient norm. We anticipate that experiment A is one of such possible instance.  
 
The Comparison of the Basic Games 
The BG results of this experiment confirm that our environment supports once more the 
display of weak free riding behaviour. The first five rounds in Figure 3 shows the level of 
public good provided (Q) throughout the entire game history. It immediately emerges that 
both  groups  start  with  a  very  similar  level  of  contribution,  coinciding  with  40%  of  the 
maximum public good achievable, ending with the 23% of the such maximum.  
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Fig. 3. The level of total public good provided (Q) in the Experiment A 
 
In the between-group comparisons, the total level of public good provided throughout the 
entire game history is not significantly different (M-W test,  174 . 0 = p ). Table 4 highlights 
that only the second round is statistically different between groups. Moreover, individual 
average contributions are not statistically different between-groups (M-W test,  169 . 0 = p ). 
 
Between-groups 
(Mann-Whitney Test)  R1-R1  R2-R2  R3-R3  R4-R4  R5-R5 
Gr1A-Gr2A  p= 0.693  p= 0.031  p= 0.314  p= 0.676  p= 0.592 
 
Table 4. Between-groups analysis. Round-wise comparisons (level of Q) in BG.A 
 
The voted rule (A-Rule) 
The rule in Experiment A is the combination of options {1A; 2D; 3A; 4A; 5D} with 
associated values (r=1; n=5; R= 0.02Q; P=βπi). The final rule hence establishes the random 
selection of one round, in which five members are audited. In the case the selected member 
is a contributor, she/he will receive a reward equal to the 2% of the collective fund. Who is 
detected to be a free rider will pay a proportional sanction, calculated as percentage of his 
own payoff. The total cost of this rule enactment is 3.5% of the total public good provided. 
This implies that the Q columns in the payoff table may shift at maximum of one column to 
the left. 
This  norm  is  classifiable  as  a  very  weakly  efficient  norm,  provided  the  relative  low 
probability to be detected and the low applicable punishment. 
The final payoff is hence differentiated among eventual contributors and eventual free riders.  
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The results of the Basic Game with Rule 
A.  The total level of public good provided and individual contributory averages 
After the insertion of this weak norm, both groups decrease their initial contribution when 
compared to the BG. In particular, Gr1A passes from the 39% of maximum level achievable 
in the game history of BG to the 32% in this game with rule. Gr2A decreases its investment 
in the public good from 30% of the maximum achievable in BG to only 7% in BG+R. 
Consequently, also the individual group average decreases, becoming  3 1 = A Gr q  Euro and 
7 . 0 2 = A Gr q  Euro. 
The second five rounds in Figure 3 show the total level of public good provided. Gr1A 
starts with 39% of maximum Q, which is the same level of public good provided in the first 
BG’s round. Gr1A concludes yielding 23% of collective contributions in the last round. On 
the other hand, Gr2A displays a continuous reduction of public good provided, beginning 
with 14% of maximum achievable and ending with quasi null contributions (the last round 
only one Euro is invested in Q). More importantly, Gr1A allocations always dominate Gr2A 
contributions  to  the  public  good.  Table  5  confirms  the  any  round-wise  comparison  is 
significantly different between-groups.  
 
Between-groups 
(Mann-Whitney Test)  R1-R1  R2-R2  R3-R3  R4-R4  R5-R5 
Gr1A-Gr2A  p=0.008  p=0.012  p=0.004  p=0.010  p=0.008 
 
Table 5. Between-groups analysis. Round-wise comparisons (level of Q) in BG+R.A   20
Mann-Whitney  test  confirms  that  between-groups  difference  is  significant,  both  in  the 
general game history ( 009 . 0 = p ) than in an individual average perspective ( 002 . 0 = p ). 
Looking at the within-group consideration without and with the norm, the two groups 
present an interesting difference. Gr1A, in fact, does not significantly reduce the individual 
average  contributions to  the  public  good  (Wilcoxon  test,  529 . 0 = p )  comparing  BG  and 
BG+R.  On  the  contrary,  Gr2A  significantly  decreases  the  individual  average  investment 
from BG to BG+R ( 004 . 0 = p ). 
These results are summarized as follows: 
Result 1.A The weak norm enactment does not improve the level of public good provided in 
both groups, and it tends to decrease the aggregate contributions. Anyhow, the effect of the 
norm is different between-groups. The constituent group does not significantly decrease the 
individual average contributions, whereas Gr2A does significantly reduce them.  
Despite of the inefficient level of public good provided, the constituent group contributes 
significantly more than the recipient group, both in aggregate and in individual level.  
 
B.  Contributory allocations and number of free riders 
Figure 4 shows the contributory frequencies throughout the entire BG+R history. The first 
relevant observation is the different modal value between-groups. Gr1A presents the half 
endowment as the most frequent allocation (about 42% of cases), whereas Gr2A’s modal 
value is  the  full  free  riding  contribution (about  71% of cases). Furthermore,  only Gr1A 





















Fig. 4. Frequencies for type of allocation (q) in BG+R.A 
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A  clear  disparity  between-groups  emerges  comparing  both  the  class  of  free  riding 
contributions  and  the  class  of  cooperative  contributions.  In  particular,  the  former  class 
reaches 44% of cases in the Gr1A and 93% of cases in Gr2A, whereas the latter achieves 
only 14%  in  Gr1A  but is completely  absent  in  Gr2A.  Nevertheless,  Mann  Whitney  test 
confirms  that  between-groups  difference  is  significant  only  for  strong  free  riding  class 
( 016 . 0 = p ) and for the class of half contributory class ( 008 . 0 = p ), whereas the remaining 
two classes does not present any significant difference. 
In  a  within-group  perspective,  the  weak  norm  enactment  has  different  effects  on  the 
contributory frequencies when compared with the allocations in BG. Although the norm is 
completely  inefficient  to  increase  the  level  of  public  good,  Gr1A  maintains  the  similar 
cooperative contributions achieved in BG. To the contrary, Gr2 completely nullifies any 
cooperative contribution, by doubling the number of weak free riders.  
 
Result  2A  Endogenous  enactment  drives  contributions  to the  minimum  allocation  which 
avoids  punishment,  without  removing  the  incentive  to  free  ride.  To  the  contrary,  the 
exogenous enactment not only is inefficient to eliminate free riding, but it leads to nullify any 
positive cooperative contribution to the public fund.  
 
Result  3A  The  number  of  total  free  riders  remains  a  frequent  contributory  allocation, 
independently of the different norm enactment. Nevertheless, the number of free riders is 
significantly smaller in case of endogenous enactment than in case of rule imposition. 
 
Experiment B 
The Comparison of the Basic Games 
The first five rounds in Figure 5 show the aggregate level of public good Q. Both groups 
start and end the game with similar amounts of public good, about 40% of the maximum 
achievable.  Nevertheless,  since  Gr1B  and  Gr2B  follow  different  round  evolution,  the 
average level of total public good provided is slightly different between groups. Specifically, 
the former group reaches 32% of the maximum Q achievable, whereas Gr2B provides 39%. 
Consequently, the final individual average contributions are respectively  2 . 3 1 = B Gr q  Euro 
and  9 . 3 2 = B Gr q Euro.  These  observations  confirm  our  BG  to  support  weak  free  riding 
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Fig. 5. The level of total public good provided (Q) in the Experiment B 
 
Mann  Whitney  test  reveals  that  the  contributory  gaps  indicated  by  Figure  9  are  not 
statistically different (see Table 6). Moreover, not even the individual contributory averages 
are significantly different between Gr1B and Gr2B (M-W test,  408 . 0 = p ). 
 
Between-groups 
(Mann-Whitney Test)  R1-R1  R2-R2  R3-R3  R4-R4  R5-R5 
Gr1B-Gr2B  p= 0.817  p= 0.439  p= 0.229  p= 0.152  p= 0.1 
 
Table 6. Between-groups analysis. Round-wise comparisons (level of Q) in BG.B 
 
The total number  of  strong  free  riders  in  Gr1B is  greater than in  Gr2B  (40% and  23% 
respectively), but the relation is reversed about the number of full contributors (21% in Gr1B 
and  31%  in  Gr2B).  Nevertheless,  this  difference  within  the  strong  free  riding  class  is 
balanced by the presence of more week free riders in Gr2B.  
 
The voted rule (B-Rule) 
The  final  rule  in  Experiment  B  is  the  combination  of  options  {1A;2D;3A;4A;5D}  with 
associated values (r=1; n= 5; R=0.02Q; P=πi). The final rule establishes that at the end of the 
third round 5 persons are controlled. In case the audited player is a contributor with more 
than 4 euro, she/he will receive a reward equal to 2% of the public fund provided. To the 
contrary, if the audited member is a free rider, the punishment coincides with the loss of 
her/his entire payoff. The enactment cost is 5.5% of the total public good provided. 
It  is  important  to  underline  that  from  the  discussion  of  the  first  phase  emerged  the 
awareness that the controlled round might not coincide with the third one. Consequently, the   23
payment might be not calculated on the third round but, as usual, the effective payoff will be 
determined by the random extraction of one round at the end of the game. Players assert to 
be completely aware about such determinant implication. 
This  type  of  voted  rule  may  be  classified  as  medium-severe  law,  since  it  states  the 
possibility to lose the entire payoff in case of control. This high severity is associated to a 
relative high probability to be detected. The total cost of the norm enactment makes the Q 
columns in the payoff shift at most by one column to the left. 
Given these observations, the final payoff may be differentiated among eventual contributors 
and eventual free riders:  
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The results of the Basic Game with Rule 
We  test  whether  the  participation  gap  is  present  in  this  experiment,  paying  particular 
attention to the (possible) behavioural consequences of having established a round for the 
control. 
A.  The total level of public good provided and individual contributory averages 
The second five rounds of Figure 5 show the total level of public good provided (Q) at the 
presence of the B-rule. Two immediate observations arise. First of all, there is a great gap 
between groups since Gr1B always contributes more. Nevertheless, this difference tends to 
be reduced after the third round. In second instance, Gr2B decreases its contribution after the 
second round, making the level of total public good to be inferior than the case of BG. 
Surprisingly, the initial level of public good provided in the constituent group nearly 
reaches the maximum obtainable, that is, people provide 99% of the total public good. To the 
contrary, Gr2B starts with 56% of the maximum achievable. 
The strong decay is amplified in the first group, in which the last round presents 37% of 
the  maximum  public  good  obtainable.  Nevertheless,  the  maximum  variation  is  observed 
from  the  third  to  the  fourth  round  (here  there  is  a  shrinkage  of  39%).  This  important   24
changing in contributions implies that the game history level achieves 71% of the maximum 
total public good available. 
The decay of Gr2B starts after the first round, with a decrement of 58% on the total 
public good. After that round, next contributions are stabilized without changing up to the 
end of the game, reaching 28% of final game history level. When compared to BG levels, 
Gr2B responds to norm enactment by further reducing about 25% of collective investments. 
Table  7  shows  the  round-wise  between-groups  comparisons,  highlighting  the  strong 
difference between constituent and recipient groups, at least up to the third round. Only the 
last round is not significantly different. Nevertheless, the total level of public good provided 
is significantly different between constituent and recipient groups (p= 0.028). 
 
Between-groups 
(Mann-Whitney Test)  R1-R1  R2-R2  R3-R3  R4-R4  R5-R5 
Gr1B-Gr2B  p= 0.009  p= 0.000  p= 0.000  p= 0.022  p= 0.344 
 
Table 7. Between-groups analysis. Round-wise comparisons (level of Q) in BG+R.B 
 
Despite the final decay in Gr1B, the individual contributory averages are extremely different 
between  groups  (M-W  000 . 0 = p   0);  they  achieve  respectively  1 . 7 1 = B Gr q   Euro  and 
8 . 2 2 = B Gr q  Euro. 
We  may  observe  the  effect  of  the  norm  enactment  by  comparing  BG  and  BG+R 
contributions. The presence of the norm has significantly affected the aggregated level of 
public  good  provided  in  Gr1B  only  in  the  first  three  rounds  (Wilcoxon  test,  001 . 0 = p , 
002 . 0 = p  and  001 . 0 = p  respectively). To the contrary, the within group analysis made for 
Gr2B  confirms  that  the  exogenous  enactment  does  not  affect  the  level  of  public  good 
provided, both in a game history perspective and in round-wise comparisons (Wilcoxon test, 
575 . 0 = p  for the first round;  309 . 0 = p  for the second one;  325 . 0 = p  for the third one; 
194 . 0 = p  for the fourth one and  306 . 0 = p  for the last one). 
 
Result 1.B Endogenous enactment implies always a greater level of public good provided 
with respect to the case of rule imposition. Nevertheless, this difference diminishes after the 
third round. This is the round suggested by the constituent group to be the one in which the 
control had to take place. 
   25
Result  2.B Despite  the  decay observed  in the  constituent group, individual contributory 
averages are significantly greater in case of endogenous enactment than in the exogenous 
one. 
 
B.  Contributory allocations and number of free riders 
Figure  6 presents  the  contributory  frequencies throughout  the entire game history.  Here, 
three picks are observed: the strong free riding contribution, the half endowment contribution 
and the full contribution. Other allocations seem to play no relevant role in both groups. 
The  modal  values  are  deeply  different  between-groups;  Gr1B  yields  60%  of  full 
contribution cases (against 16% in Gr2B), while Gr2B attains 47% of strong free riding 
allocations (against 14% in Gr1B). Both groups present the second modal value in the half 





















Fig. 6. Frequencies for type of allocation (q) in BG+R.B 
 
In the first round comparison, Gr1B displays the quasi unanimity of allocations on the full 
contributions (13/14 members invested the entire endowment and only a person invests 9 
euro). To the contrary, Gr2B divides its allocations among the full contributors (50% of 
cases) and pure strong free riders (28% of cases). Moreover, Gr2B’s class of strong free 
riding allocations are three times greater than those in Gr1B. On the contrary, the number of 
total full contributions in Gr2B is nearly one fourth of those in Gr1B. The unique similarity 
is in the class of half contributions (23% in Gr1B and 17% in Gr2B). 
Mann  Whitney  test  confirms  the  statistical  difference  among  the  aforementioned 
contributory classes. Specifically,  020 . 0 = p  for the strong free riding class;  013 . 0 = p  in   26
weak free riding class and  028 . 0 = p  in the cooperative class. The only non-significantly 
different class is the half endowment one ( 456 . 0 = p ). 
 
Result 3B The endogenous enactment drives firstly allocations to the cooperative class, then 
to the half endowment contributions and, finally, to the strong free riding class. This order is 
reversed in case of imposition.  
The endogenous implementation has a strong deterrence effect at least in the first three 
rounds.  To  the  contrary,  the  imposition  is  not  able  to  reduce  the  free  riding  display, 
especially the strong free riding allocations. 
 
Several comparisons between the three experiments 
The three experiments presented in this section clearly give a positive answer to our original 
question, that is, participating in the determination of the norm implies different contribution 
levels when compared to the imposition of the same norm, taking as fixed other conditions. 
Our results also suggest a possible direction of such difference, that is, endogenous creation 
provides greater level of contribution than does exogenous introduction.  
Although  the  constituent  groups  display  greater  levels  of  contribution  in  BG+R,  not 
always  does  the  mere  presence  of  the  sanctioning  rule  efficiently  increase  the  levels  of 
contributions. As found in experiment A, the introduction of a weak norm does not improve 
personal contributions when compared to the investments of the BG. Instead, medium-severe 
norms  have  amplified  the  direction  of  positive  contributions  in  the  constituent  groups. 
Nonetheless, these norms have not a clear direction on recipient groups’ contributions. In 
fact  -although  not  in  a  significant  way-  they  have  caused  both  an increase  (in  the  pilot 
experiment) and a decrease (in experiment B).  
With  caution,  several  between-experiment  comparisons  may  be  made.  The  three 
experiments are based on three different voted norms. As anticipated in the experimental 
design, the aim of this study is not to test different degrees of effectiveness associated with 
different norms. Nevertheless, it is simple to point out that the actual efficacy of the norm is 
related to the content of its formulation, in terms of both punishments and audits, at least in 
the constituent groups. This seems to confirm previous experimental results in the literature, 
in which different types of norm have generated different level of contributions (see, for 
example, Decker, Stiehler & Strobel, 2003).  
The three norms show some similarities in their components. Whenever a pairwise-rule 
comparison highlights only one different element, we may point out some considerations 
about the effect of the single isolated component. For example, the rule created in the pilot   27
experiment is similar to the one generated in experiment A, except for the type of sanctions. 
Provided that the two recipient groups (i.e. Gr2P and Gr2A) are not significantly different in 
BG
9, we may make a first remark about the role of the different types of punishment. From 
this perspective, it seems that the threat of complete payoff loss has stronger effect
10 than the 
proportional sanction, if all the other normative components are equal.  
Moreover, P-rule is similar to B-rule, except for the presence of the indication of the 
round under control. Since this announcement does not have effect on Gr2B behaviour, the 
comparison  between  Gr2P  and  Gr2B  suggests  that  round  indication  does  not  improve 
contributions but, in fact, it seems to reduce them
11. 
Interestingly, in the constituent groups there could be a positive correlation between the 
strength of the norm and its social support, based on the electoral group that has supported it. 
The norms voted  in  the  pilot experiment  and  in  experiment  B  are supported by a  quasi 
unanimity of preferences for 3/5 components, whereas in experiment A only the weaker 
component (concerning the possibility to reward) obtains the quasi totality of preferences. In 
the same direction, we observe the final rules of groups Gr1P and Gr1B to have greater 
impact on the contributory levels. This is quite important, since the experimental design has 
not explicitly required the need for unanimity to determine the final rule. Nevertheless, in 
these  two  experiments  the  constituent  groups  spontaneously  reach  unanimous  consensus 
about  the  majority  of  the  voted  components.  Our  results  suggest  that  wider  social  rule-
acceptance  provides  greater  level  of  confidence  about  future  conformity.  However,  the 
reinforcement  of  individual  expectation  about  others’  contribution  should  increase  the 
incentive to free ride. This does not seem to be the case for these two constituent groups. On 
the contrary, it appears that voting the rule and participating in its creation, promotes the 
effective  acceptance  of  the  rule  itself  (i.e.  the  compliance  with  the  contributory  norm). 
Nevertheless, in the light of the results of experiment A, contributory levels improve only 
when the norm has received a wide collective support and its formulation is severe enough.  
                                                
9 Non parametric tests verify that Gr2P and Gr2A are not statistically different throughout the entire 
history of BG. Mann Whitney test shows the absence of any difference, in terms of the total level of 
public good provided (p= 0.563) and the individual average contribution (p= 0.877). The round-wise 
comparisons yield p= 0.457 (R1); p= 0.681 (R2); p= 0.777 (R3); p= 0.791 (R4) and p= 0.411 (R5). 
10 Mann Whitney test run for Gr2P and Gr2A in BG+R shows significant difference in terms of total 
level of public good provided (p= 0.009) and individual average contributions (p= 0.000). The round-
wise  comparisons  reveal  a  unique  weak  significance  in  the  third  round  (p=  0.061).  The  other 
comparisons yield p= 0.038 (R1); p= 0.014 (R2); p= 0.004 (R4); p= 0.000 (R5). 
11 The individual average contributions are not significant different in the BG of Gr2P and Gr2B (p= 
0.260), despite of the total public good (p= 0.022). Nevertheless, no round is significantly different in 
round-wise comparisons. Specifically, p= 0.520 (R1); p= 0.437 (R2); p= 0.421 (R3); p= 0.462 (R4); 
p= 0.223 (R5). In BG+R, there are no significantly differences, both in the average contributions (p= 
0.334) and in the aggregate level of public good (p=0.117). No round-wise comparison reveals any 
significant difference, given p= 0.260 (R1); p= 0.270 (R2); p= 0.334 (R3); p= 0.147 (R4) and p= 
0.107).   28
The above considerations parallel several experimental results in the literature, in which 
different voting rules (i.e. when comparing simple majority, absolute majority and unanimity 
rules) are explicitly asserted to affect the norm effectiveness (see, for example, Fischer & 
Nicklisch, 2007). The focus of our study, however, is to verify whether participating in a 




The three previous experiments represent an extremely reduced portion of possible cases that 
can  be  generated,  given  the  high  number  of  potential  combinations  of  norms.  We  are 
perfectly aware that many other replications are necessary in order to be more confident 
about several general observations. Nevertheless, and within the same conditions, we would 
like to make some remarks about the insights we have gained from these studies. 
 
Remark 1 Participating in a normative process has different consequences with respect 
to merely receiving the norm (i.e. without participating in the process of its creation). 
 
Remark 2 Being member of a constituent group has positive implications on individual 
contributions, with respect to being the simple recipient of the norm. 
 
Remark  3  The  effect  of  participation  is  positive,  independently  of  the  specific 
formulation of the norm. In any observed case, and in all normative formulations, the 
endogenous implementation provides significantly higher level of collective public good 
provided,  as  well  as  lower  numbers  of  free  riders  and  greater  individual  average 
contributions than in the case of exogenous implementation.  
 
Further  studies  are  required  to  provide  support  as  to  why  participation  determines  such 
results. The present study is not designed to test different explanations, since it has been 
structured  only  to  verify  whether  participating  has  effect  or  not.  Several  possible 
justifications may be taken into account but, since we do not provide any statistical support 
for any of them, they may all be considered to be equally probable. First of all, the normative 
enactment is differentiated because of the different procedures, that is, in the first case the 
norm is generated by a phase of discussion and vote whereas, in the second case, it is directly 
applied to the other group. Note that the norm is exogenously enforced on both groups. In 
other words, once the norm is created, both groups know that it will be concretely applied at 
the end of the game. Moreover, both groups are perfectly aware that the norm implications 
will really be applied (i.e. the established punishments and rewards will be enforced by the   29
experimenter). Given the same final norm, the different normative enactments should not 
differentiate  before  the  potential  degree  of  between-group  conformity.  In  other  words, 
individuals  are  completely  free  to  choose  what  they  want  to  contribute  in  BG+R, 
independently of having participated in the process or not.  
In both groups people perfectly realize that the rule will be effective but, in the light of 
the experimental results, their different affiliated groups seem to have played a role. We 
wonder why these between-group differences have occurred in relation to the different norm 
enactments. 
If, as we have assumed, the differences are due to the participation procedure, several 
different causal elements may be taken into account. The next points provide some examples 
of possible environmental variations in order to properly isolate- whenever possible- the role 
of these single elements
12. 
At least three different classes of elements may concur to originate the gap between self-
determination  and  imposition:  the  procedure  itself,  individual  expectations,  socio-
psychological dynamics associated with participation. 
 
A.  The procedure itself 
A first question concerns the procedure itself, based on discussion and voting by a step-by-
step process. Nevertheless, the discussion stage is not what discriminates the two groups. 
The socio-psychological literature asserts the importance of communication as a device to 
build up social identity. Provided that both groups have discussed for the same period of 
time, this seems not to be the most important element for discriminating between the two 
groups. 
More  interestingly,  the  voting  procedure  may  have  more  strongly  affected  the  final 
outcome. The  classical institutional approach deems  voting to be a social instrument for 
converting  individual  preferences  into  collective  decision  (see,  for  example,  Ledyard  & 
Palfrey,  2002).  Moreover,  voting  may  generate  conformity  expectations,  and  may  allow 
people  to  signal  future  contributory  intentions.  From  the  latter  perspective,  voting  is, 
therefore,  an  instrument  for  informal  commitment,  which  may  induce  conditional 
cooperators to positively react to their expectations about others’ contribution (as in Tyran & 
Feld, 2006).  
We have assumed the presence of heterogeneous subgroups of agents for both groups, 
without going into detail about any specific form of preferences. Following the example of 
Tyran and Feld (2006), the presence of conditional cooperators could be one explanation for 
                                                
12 Several socio psychological components may remain undetected or difficult to be singled out.   30
positive contribution, but it may not be exclusive, for instance, if we assume the co-presence 
of other types of players, such as reciprocators, self-oriented agents, altruists, and so on. 
Necessary modifications of our environment should be taken into account in order to ratify 
whether  the  presence  of  one  class  of  preferences  is  dominant  or  not,  both  within-  and 
between-group dynamics. These modifications lead to the consideration of the approaches 
which elicit individual and social preferences (see, for example, Fischbacher & Gachter, 
2006). 
The socio-psychological  literature  asserts  that  norms  have  to be activated in people’s 
mind  to  perform  any  of  their  manifold  functions  (such  as  behavioural  clue,  informative 
anchoring), or to coordinate behaviour (see for instance Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005). 
Norm activation may be obtained both by deliberate and unintended processes. To this aim, 
voting for a rule may be one possible method to activate, for instance, cooperative behaviour 
(as in Tyran & Feld, 2006).  
The  step-by-step  procedure  is  chiefly  inserted  in  order  to  allow  people  to  focus  on 
components  one  at  time,  with  the  aim  of  decomposing  the  presumed  complexity  of 
understanding  a  norm  in  its  whole.  Nevertheless,  following  the  classical  Buchanan  and 
Tullock approach (1962), the decomposition may have generated higher decisional costs in 
the constituent groups, at least in units of time (the Rule Phase may potentially require up to 
30 minutes in total). From this perspective, in fact, different levels of contributions may be 
traced  back  to  these  higher  decisional  costs.  This  would  mean  that  much  inner-group 
dynamics was due, for example, to people trying to compensate decisional costs with greater 
positive contributions. This seems to be a very weak justification for providing support to the 
different behaviour observed in the BG+R of the constituent groups. 
 
B.  Expectations 
Both socio-psychology and economics acknowledge the existence of a relationship between 
conformity and individual expectations about others’ compliance. These approaches may be 
suitably adopted to provide possible explanations for the different results obtained in the case 
of  self-determination  and  in  the  case  of  imposition.  Nevertheless,  as  reported  in  the 
introduction, economics scholars necessarily differentiate their consideration according to 
the theoretical models they take as benchmark.  
At least two different explanations may be provided to support the differences observed 
in the three experiments. The first one assumes that different contributions may be explained 
in  terms  of  different  expectations  generated  within  groups.  If  positive  contributions  are 
positively correlated with expectations, this will be the case in which the constituent groups 
display higher  expectations  of  normative  compliance,  than  those formed in the recipient   31
groups (First Hypothesis). The second explanation assumes that the different way in which 
the norm is enacted provides the same expectations; therefore, the difference between groups 
should be explained in terms of individual replies to these expectations. If this perspective is 
correct, greater contributions in the constituent groups seem to be related to positive reply 
(i.e.  positive  reciprocations,  or  activations  of  conditional  cooperators),  whereas  recipient 
groups’  answers  should  be  more  strategically  oriented,  that  is,  people  reply  to  positive 
expectations by free riding more intensely (Second Hypothesis). 
The present design is not able to discern whether one of the aforementioned perspectives 
is the proper one or whether, instead, a combination of both is the answer. In this regard, 
Bicchieri’s  approach (1997,  2006) may  give a  good hint  to properly modify  the  present 
experimental environment in order to test which type of expectation may be quoted to justify 
these experimental results. In particular, it could be interesting to distinguish whether the two 
groups have or not the same direction in terms of empirical and normative expectations. 
Provided the existence of a correlation between expectations and effective contributions
13, 
the  distinction  of  the  direction  of  the  expectations  may  lead  to  verifying  the  two 
aforementioned  hypotheses.  The  support  for  the  First  Hypothesis  is  provided  by  testing 
whether  the  constituent  groups  have  both  greater  empirical  and  normative  expectations, 
when  compared  to  the  recipient  groups.  On  the  contrary,  the  support  for  the  Second 
Hypothesis is provided  by  testing  whether  the constituent  groups diverge as regards  the 
relationship between contributions and normative, and/or the empirical expectations. The 
main problem associated with these hypotheses regards the search for a proper method to 
correctly  elicit  expectations.  To  this  end,  scholars  acknowledge  the  robustness  of  the 
“strategy method” à la Selten (Fischbacher & Gachter, 2006, Feld & Tyran, 2006). 
Another way to justify our results according to individual expectations is to adopt some 
arguments in Bicchieri (2000) and Young (2006). Both authors deem the creation of the 
norm  to  be  potentially  perceived  as  a  focal  point  for  future  coordination.  Nevertheless, 
following Peres (2006), the existence of the norm itself may activate the focal point. From 
this perspective, our group constituents or receivers equally activate a focal point, caused by 
the presence of the norm. However, it remains to be explained why the same focal point 
provided different between-group results. 
 
C.  Social-psychological dynamics associated with participation 
In addition to the previous possible justifications, we believe that important supports have to 
be sought in a multidisciplinary approach. To this end, the socio-psychological contributions 
                                                
13 Here, we do not specify the causal relation between expectation and behaviour (neither in favour of 
the False Consensus nor in favour of the Triangle Hypothesis).   32
may deepen the between-group considerations in terms of different within-group dynamics. 
Multiple explanations may be quoted to justify the positive role of participation, for instance, 
in  terms  of  compliance,  group  goal,  personal  involvement,  closeness  effect,  and  inner 
coherence. 
Suppose that the observed level of compliance associated with the same norm is different 
between the constituent groups and the recipient groups. This would mean that groups that 
have generated the norm respond with a higher degree of compliance. This may be explained 
by following  Aronson et  al.  (2005), who explicitly define the  set  elements  which affect 
individual  compliance  to  a  group  norm.  For  instance,  the  “collective  agreement”  of 
constituent groups is achieved through the voting procedures, implying that those norms are 
supported by wide consensus of the group. Moreover, the voting procedure may represent a 
form of prior commitment (see item A in this section). Therefore, contributions in BG+R 
may be interpreted as a sign of compliance, in response to a sort of inner coherence for 
previously expressed  commitments. In contrast, the cases of imposition seem to imply a 
lower  degree  of  compliance.  The  psychological  discipline  acknowledges  that  people 
sometimes prefer not to abide by a particular rule. This is the case, for example, when people 
perceive  the  norm  as  a  limitation  of  personal  behaviour.  Following  this  reasoning,  the 
recipient groups may have perceived the norm as an effective imposition and, consequently, 
as a limit to their individual behaviour. 
The  Rule-Phase  frame  may  parallel  Yamagishi’s  Structural  Goal-Expectation  (1986). 
Adapting this perspective to our study, the creation of the norm should represent both the 
group goal and the instrumental cooperation. Whenever the norm enactment is thought of as 
a group goal, other socio-psychological studies may be quoted. For example, Neuberg and 
Fiske (1987) recognize the so called “outcome dependency” as an element that may reinforce 
individual conformity to the established group goal. In addition, Locke and Lathman (2002) 
state  that  the  more  specific  and  well  defined  goals  are,  the  more  likely  they  are  to  be 
attained
14.  
In-group interactions are not only related to the presence of group goals, but are also 
related  to  the  “social  influence”  perspective.  We  are  aware  that  our  experimental  spot 
relations are not the correct settings for social influence and social identity in a purely socio-
psychological perspective. Nevertheless, we may notice some (limited) interesting analogies. 
For instance, having participated in a group decision with direct involvement should have 
                                                
14 This consideration deems our norm procedure (decomposition of five components) to be a “well 
defined goal”.   33
induced agents to activate a sort of individual responsibility in achieving the group goal
15. 
This kind of individual responsibility may be reinforced by considering the use of the face-
to-face communication, although agents play the BG+R under complete anonymity.  
The interpretation of positive effects as due to participation seems to parallel Young’s 
model (1988), who asserts that internal rewards may be linked to the satisfaction deriving the 
mere  act  of  personal  participation.  Of  course,  this  statement  more  directly  refers  to  the 
definition of ‘fair perception’ in that model, which our study does not explicitly assume. 
The positive effects of participation in a self-enacting decision may be also explained 
using the closeness effect. In our frame, being close means being directly involved in the 
decisional process. As a consequence, this personal involvement may activate a sort of inner 
coherence, or a sense of individual responsibility. 
The latter considerations are very important, since (under obvious limitations) they may 
find several analogies with the Subsidiarity principle. Several Law scholars acknowledge the 
importance  of  the  Subsidiarity  principle  as  a  foundation  of  the  statement  “Autonomy  is 
Responsibility and  vice  versa”  (see,  for  example,  Cassese, 2002; Arena, 2006
16).  In  this 
regard, the standard-version results may give a (marginal) support to the validity of that 
principle, in particular for the horizontal definition. Our constituent groups could represent 
decisional (decentralized) committees, where individuals actively participate in normative 
enactments which discipline group interests. This sort of personal closeness may enforce the 
individual  responsibility toward  the collective  dimension and,  indirectly,  it may improve 
individual compliance.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this experimental design is to test whether direct involvement in a decisional 
problem, which is a second order public good in itself, may affect individual contributions. 
The question whether participation in norm enactment provides a contributory difference 
with respect to when the norm is received has not been addressed in public good literature so 
far. 
We assumed the presence of heterogeneous players, without specifying any specific type 
of preference. We tested for the absence of significant differences between groups in BG. 
Since both groups displayed the same level of free riding, on average, we conjectured that 
                                                
15 The group achievement is calculated on the basis of the effective efficiency of the norm in BG+R, 
which means the effective public good provided as a percentage of the maximum achievable.  
16 These works are in Italian. Similar arguments in English are in Arena and Chiti (2002) “Public 
Administration,  Competitiveness  and  Sustainable  Development”,  Istituto  Italiano  di  Scienze 
Amministrative, Florence University Press.   34
we had heterogeneous groups which did not affect the main prediction of our BG. In other 
words, independently of any within-group specification, the prediction of weak free riding is 
realized  in  our  baseline  game.  Moreover,  we  stated  that  both  groups  have  equally 
experienced the free riding problem at the end of the BG. 
The  Pilot  experiment  and  its  two  replications  show  a  sort  of  behavioural  regularity: 
participating in a normative procedure, which is self-enforcing, provides a greater level of 
contributions and a smaller number of free riders, than receiving the same norm, taking other 
conditions  as  fixed.  This  difference  is  significant  whenever  we  compare  the  constituent 
groups to receiver groups, in the whole game history. From a round-wise comparison, we 
obtain that the first rounds of the BG+R are always significantly different between groups. In 
the first round, the constituent groups always contribute more, and the number of free riders 
is always smaller than that of the recipients, independently of the specific norm enacted. 
We  obtained  three  different  final  rules,  which  differ  partly  in  their  components.  We 
observed  that,  according  to  previous  experiments  in  the  literature,  the  norm  formulation 
influenced  the  level  of  total  public  good  provided.  We  noticed  that  our  weakest  norm 
decreased the level of public good provided, when compared to the BG. Nevertheless, the 
gap is also realized in this condition. 
We proposed some possible explanations to justify why participation may affect the level 
of public good provision. We distinguished three possible perspectives in order to interpret 
our  gap:  the  specific  enactment  procedure,  individual  expectations,  and  the  socio-
psychological contributions. The specific procedure involves three main elements: a step-by-
step procedure, the discussion stage, and the voting stage. Each of these may have potentially 
affected  individual  behaviour  via  expectations,  or  through  within-group  dynamics. 
Nevertheless, since the sanctioning system is a second-order public good, the expectations of 
greater contributions (i.e. the expectation of group conformity) should lead to a greater level 
of free riding. This prediction should be the same for both groups, independently of the norm 
enactment. This does not seem to be our case, at least in the constituent groups. Probably, 
our gap may be explained once non-theoretical standard approaches are involved. In this 
regard, we mentioned the role of the voting procedure and discussion phase to form potential 
group dynamics, aimed at achieving the group goal of normative compliance. In this sense, 
our  results  may  support  a  decentralized  model  of  norm  enactment  (for  instance,  the 
Subsidiarity principle), or endogenous norm enforcement (like, for instance, Yamagishi’s 
and Falkinger’s models). 
Bicchieri’s  definition  of  expectations  seems  to  be  a  possible  avenue  to  a  deeper 
understanding of our results. The separation of expectations into empirical and normative   35
ones  may  represent  our  gap  in  terms  of  different  group  expectations,  or  different  group 
reaction to those expectations. Nevertheless, the present standard version designs are not 
able to test Bicchieri’s perspective.  
We are aware that these experiments represent only a preliminary test of the existence of 
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(This is a translation of the original Italian version) 
[In brackets the variations for the second group] 
 
Welcome and thank you for your participation 
With this game you can earn an amount of money, which depends both on your decisions and on what 
other players will decide. 
Please read carefully the following instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and 
an experimenter will clarify your doubts.  
Throughout the whole game, you are not allowed to communicate. The violation of this rule leads to 
the exclusion from the experiment and from all payments. 
To ensure your anonymity, you will play using your ID. Nobody will be able to trace your personal 
identity from your decisions. Please, key in your ID whenever required. 
This game consists of three separate parts, which will be presented in sequence.   38
1.  Basic Game. This is the baseline game of the entire experiment. It consists of 5 independent 
stages (rounds).  
2.  Rule-Game. In this part you and other players will decide a rule, by means of a specific 
procedure of discussion and voting. 
3.  Basic Game with rule. You will play the Basic Game with the norm. [3. Again the Basic 
Game with a change]. 
The payoff table is the same for all participants, 14 players including yourself. This table will help you 
to make your choices. The instructions about the payoff table will be given in the next steps. The 
instructions for the Rule-Game will be provided after the Basic Game. 
At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash. 
Basic Game 
The decision situation 
You have an endowment of 10 Euro, that you can invest. You can decide to invest between two 
different funds, called Private Fund and Collective Fund, respectively.  
You  decide  how  many  Euro  to  allocate  to  the  different  funds.  Any  combination  is  acceptable, 
provided that your digits are integer numbers in the range 0 to 10 (included), and that the sum of the 
amounts invested is 10 Euro.  
In general: 
-  Any  Euro  spent  in  the  Private  Fund  guarantees  you  will  receive  at  least  the  same  amount. 
Examples: if you decide to invest 10 Euro, you will receive at least 10 Euro; if you invest 8 Euro 
you will receive at least 8 Euro.  
-  The  Collective  Fund  pays  a  variable  return,  which  depends  on  the  amount  present  in  the 
Collective Fund itself. The amount in the Collective Fund is the sum of all contributions that you 
and  other  players  will  decide  to  invest  in  this  fund.  The  greater  the  amount  present  in  the 
Collective Fund, the more money the fund will return.  
The Computer calculates how many Euro are invested in the Collective Fund; it applies a rate of 
0.8%, and such increased amount will be equally divided into 14 parts, one for each player. You 
will receive 1/14 of the Collective Fund, independently of your initial investment in this fund.  
Only in the case when the Collective fund reaches 140 Euro, does it return 15 euro to each player. 
Example: you decide to invest 4 Euro in the Collective Fund. As soon as other players enter their 
investment, the computer will calculate the total amount present in the Collective Fund and its 
relative interest. For instance, if the Collective Fund has 100 Euro, the computer will announce 
108 Euro, which divided into 14 equal parts, will provide 7.7 Euro to each player.  
The real values obtained from the investment will be approximated (example 1,12 becomes 1; 
2,49 becomes 2.5; 3,39 becomes 3.5 and so on) 
Your payoff 
Your final payoff is the sum of your initial investment in the private Fund, plus 1/14 of the Collective 
Fund. Example: you invest 4 Euro in the Collective Fund and, consequently, the remaining 6 Euro are 
invested in the Private Fund. If the computer announces 100 Euro, your payoff will be 14 Euro: 
14 7 . 13
14
) 08 . 0 1 ( 100
6 → =
+
+   Euro 
From the Private Fund  From the Collective Fund =6 Euro + 7.7 Euro 
The Payoff Table 
The payoff table helps you to understand your possible payoff.  
In  the  first  column  you  find  any  possible  allocation  to  the  Collective  Fund  (from  0  to  10  Euro 
included). In the first line you find all possible levels of Collective Fund that the computer may 
announce (from 0 to 140 Euro included). 
Your possible payoff corresponds to the intersection of your investment choice in the Collective Fund, 
with the column of the possible amount announced by the computer. Any cell already includes the 
sum of your investment returns, from both the private and the collective investment. You can check 
that the payoff in the example above is really the intersection of line 4 Euro, with column 100 Euro. 
(See Fig.1). 
The  announcement  is  made  after  you  and  other  players  key  in  your  investment  choice.  The 
announcement of the Collective Fund, and your relative payoff, indicates the end of a round.  
Your initial investment, the Collective Fund and your payoff are recorded at the top of the computer 
screen (see Fig. 2).  
The procedure of the Basic Game   39
At the beginning, the computer will ask you to key in your ID. After that, click OK. From here on, all 
procedures will be computerized. Please, key in your ID whenever required. After the first Collective 
Fund announcement, you will have to make four more choices. All rounds are independent of the 
others, that is, at the beginning of a new round you always have 10 Euro available. The Basic Game 
will end after the fifth announcement is made. The payment for this game is made at the end of the 
experiment, by randomly extracting one round among the five you have played. During the entire 
game you are not allowed to communicate. 
 








0-13  14-27  28-41  42-55  56-69  70-83  84-97  98-111  112-125  126-139  140 
0  10.5  11.5  12.5  13.5  14.5  15.5  16.5  18  19  20   
1  9  10.5  11.5  12.5  13.5  14.5  15.5  17  18  19   
2  8  9  10  11.5  12.5  13.5  14.5  16  17  18   
3  7  8  9  10  11.5  12.5  13.5  15  16  17   
4  6  7  8  9  10  11.5  12.5  14  15  16   
5  5.5  6  7  8  9  10  11.5  13  14  15   
6  4.5  5.5  6  7  8  9  10  11.5  13  14   
7  3.5  4.5  5.5  6  7  8  9  10.5  12  13   
8  2.5  3.5  4.5  5.5  6  7  8  9.5  10.5  12   
9  2  2.5  3.5  4.5  5.5  6  7  8.5  9.5  11   
10  1  2  2.5  3.5  4.5  5.5  6.5  7.5  8.5  9.5  15 
Fig.1 Payoff Table 
Control Questions 
Please answer the following questions: 
1)  If you decide to invest 0 Euro in the Private Fund, and the computer announces 70 Euro, 
what is your final payoff? _________ 
2)  If you decide to invest 0 Euro in the Collective Fund, and the computer announces 70 Euro, 
what is your final payoff? _________ 
3)  If you decide to invest 3 Euro in the Private Fund, and the computer announces 12 Euro, 
what is your final payoff? __________ 
4)  If you decide to invest 3 Euro in the Collective Fund, and the computer announces 12 Euro, 
what is your final payoff? ___________ 
 
 
Fig.2 Basic Game’s Computer screen (Italian version)   40
Rule-Phase 
The aim of this game is to create a rule which significantly reduces the individual investments in the 
Collective Fund from 0 to 4 Euro included, that is, to promote the investment from 5 to 10 Euro 
included. 
This rule will be inserted in your next Basic Game. 
The rule consists of 5 components, which decide: 
-  When the control takes place; 
-  The number of players that are audited; 
-  The possibility to reward people who contribute with more than 4 Euro included; 
-  The type of reward; 
-  The type of sanction to be applied to players who contribute from 0 to 4 Euro included. 
The game consists of a sequence of five phases, one for each rule component.  
All components have a set of alternatives (options). As you will see, these options may be related to 
some costs.  
You can briefly discuss the set of options with other players. To communicate, you will use a chat, 
where your name will be kept anonymous by means of your ID. 
At the end of the chat, you will proceed to the voting stage. Your vote is free and anonymous. 
The winner option for each phase is the one which has the majority of preferences. If two options have 
the same number of preferences, you will vote again. If there is parity another time, the computer will 
randomly select the winner option. 
After the rule is completed, you will play the Basic Game, being aware now that the norm is actually 
in force. 
Please note that: 
-  The computer will present all phases, one at a time; 
-  After you read all the available options, the chat will be open for a maximum period of time 
indicated by the computer. 
-  When the available time elapses, the chat will be closed and it will not be possible to enter it 
again. 
-  You can vote only when the chat is closed 
-  Any winner option will be announced by the computer.  
-  Any winner option will be displayed on the lower part of the computer screen. 
The Discussion Phase 
The communication within the chat is NOT free. You can exchange opinions about any single option, 
its advantages/disadvantages, and so on, but it is strictly forbidden to communicate the amount you 
will contribute in subsequent rounds. 
The discussion phase is open for a period, which the experimenter will announce at the beginning of 
each phase. It is possible to close the discussion before the expiry of the available period. This may 
occur when you and all other players deem the information exchanged in the chat to be sufficient. The 
discussion phase will be closed when all of you will communicate “I’m ready to vote”. In any case, 
the discussion phase will be closed as soon as the available time is over. When the chat is closed, you 
will proceed to the voting stage.  
Phases 
First Phase. “When to control” Component.  (Discussion phase: maximum 8 minutes) 
In order to significantly reduce the number of allocations from zero to four Euro (included), 
how often is it necessary to audit? 
Options: 
A ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ Establish now the selected audited round. If A is the winner option, you will propose the round 
you prefer to be controlled. This option costs 5% of the collective final fund. 
B ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ One round randomly extracted at the end of the game. This control will cost 3% of the collective 
final fund 
C ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ At the end of each round. This control will cost 40% of the collective final fund. 
D ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ Two rounds randomly extracted at the end of the game. This control will cost 6% of collective 
fund.  
E  ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ Three rounds randomly extracted at the end  of the game.  This control will cost 9% of the 
collective final fund. 
It is very important to know that:   41
Your effective payoff will always be determined by randomly extracting ONE round at the end of the 
Basic Game with Rule, BUT: 
If the winner option is A or C, your payoff will coincide with the one of a randomly extracted round. 
If the winner option is B, the payoff coincides with the controlled round. 
If the winner option is D or E, your payoff will coincide with one round randomly extracted among 
that set of rounds. 
Second  Phase.  “Number  of  players  to  be  audited”  Component.  (Discussion  phase:  maximum  5 
minutes) 
In  order  to  significantly  reduce  the  number  of  allocations  between  zero  and  four  Euro 
(included), how many players should be audited? 
Options: 
A ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ One player (this option costs 0.1% of the final Collective Fund) 
B ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ Two players (this option costs 0.2% of the final Collective Fund)  
C ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ Three players (this option costs 0.3% of the final Collective Fund) 
D ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ Five players (this option cost 0.5% of the final Collective Fund) 
Third Phase. “Reward possibility” Component. (Discussion phase: maximum 4 minutes). 
Do you want to provide rewards to audited player(s), who will have contributed with more than 
four Euro? 
Options: 
A ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ Yes 
B ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ No 
Fourth Phase. “Type of Reward” Component. (Discussion phase: maximum 5 minutes) 
The reward to the audited player(s) who has (have) contributed with more than four Euro, 
consists of 
Options: 
A ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ A bonus coinciding with 2% of the Collective Fund. This amount will be paid without any 
implication to the Collective Fund provided. In other words, this bonus will be a windfall.   
B ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞  A bonus coinciding with 2% of the Collective Fund. This amount will be paid by the audited 
player(s) if she/he is (they are) not contributor(s). In the case that the control does not reveal the 
presence of any non-contributor, this amount will be paid by all other uncontrolled players.  
Fifth Phase. “Type of Sanction” Component. (Discussion Phase: maximum 8 minutes) 
What is the sanction to the audited member(s), in the case she/he has (they have) contributed 
from zero to four Euro (included)? 
Options: 
A monetary sanction equivalent to: 
A1 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞     2% of the net Collective Fund 
A2 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞    10% of her/his (their) payoff 
A proportional monetary sanction, related to the degree of her/his (their) level of non-contribution. 
Options: 
B1 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞    a percentage of the net Collective Fund. In particular, if q=0 she/he pays 5% of the fund; if 
q=1 she/he pays 4% of the fund; if q=2 she/he pays 3% of the fund; if q=3 she/he pays 2% 
of the fund; if q=4 she/he pays 1% of the fund. 
B2 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞    a percentage of her/his payoff. In particular, if q=0 she/he pays 10% of her/his payoff; if q=1 
she/he pays 8% of her/his payoff; if q=2 she/he pays 6% of her/his payoff; if q=3 she/he 
pays 4% of her/his payoff; if q=4 she/he pays 2% of her/his payoff. 
 C ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞     She/he will completely lose her/his payoff. 
 